Wednesday, February 12, 2014

National Psychology, Sochi, and What Comes After

Something my history courses talked about that my political science courses didn't was the notion of a "national psychology."  It makes sense that the latter has little to say on the topic: political science has a long history of being concerned more with a country's sovereign than the people in it, while if you break with that tradition and put an emphasis on the unwashed masses, assigning them a collective consciousness is a bit ludicrous.

But national psychology tends to crop up in history, as we try to ascribe a narrative to past events and explain why they happened.  World War II was the result of lingering resentment after Germany was given all the blame for World War I.  Imperial Japan became increasingly aggressive and contemptuous of the international system after being slighted instead of being recognized as the major power it was, and of course the victorious Americans couldn't charge, much less execute, the emperor for war crimes because the Japanese national psyche couldn't withstand the loss of its royal figurehead. 

Now, there might be some glimmers of truth in such tales, but perhaps it would be better to focus on the nationalist psyche of a country's leadership.  Better to say that the Nazi leadership was eager to restore lost prestige at the cost of other countries' territory, rather than that every German citizen was willing to start a new war to make up for losing the last one.  It's not as sweeping a generalization, and lets us be more specific with the blame.

The reason I bring this up is again, Sochi.

The Council of Foreign Relations put up another good article explaining the potential fallout from the Winter Olympics, not so much due to improperly installed commodes, but rather how the international focus on the country reveals so many of Russia's problems.  Ethnic tensions and terrorism, financial waste and corruption, issues that undermine the country's prestige and claims of being a functioning world power, much less an exceptional nation. 

If we were to go with the historical narratives, we could worry that Russia, having embarrassed itself (herself?) on the world stage, might attempt to restore its prestige in less constructive ways, falling further back into Soviet habits in an effort to be taken seriously as a superpower again, sort of like how some fundamentalist Islamists assume that restoring the caliphate will automatically return the Middle East to its medieval glory.  If we were a little more specific, we might worry what Putin might do if he feels the Olympics have been a less than positive experience for Russia.

On the individual, country-ruler level Sestanovich's article is reassuring: Putin is likely to be distant and coolly antagonistic towards Western leaders after the Olympics because that's how he was acting previously.  And on the national level, there are good signs from citizens who would like a "normal" Russia rather than a country that fits Putin's brand of exceptionalism, and opportunities for opposition groups to start taking back political power.  More positives come from this CNN piece, where near the bottom the author describes the helpful, friendly attitude of Russian Olympic volunteers as being the equal of London's workers from just a few years ago, regardless of how authoritarian the country's ruler is.  So it looks like Russia's national psychology can withstand Sochi without plunging the world into flames, which is good news.

But if Putin's unlikely to change course, and the positive trends in Russia were already ongoing, what does the increased scrutiny the Olympics brought to Russia actually accomplish?  More people are talking about Russia's economy, domestic and foreign policy, but experts have known this stuff for years now.  We can now talk about how the Sochi glimpses are symptoms of deeper problems in Russia, but what's the next step?  What can we do with this increased awareness?

The articles don't have an answer, and I don't think I have one either.  Maybe some people convinced that Russia was still a Cold War colossus now can feel less frightened?  Pro-democratic non-governmental organizations can swoop in and try to help swing the pendulum back towards democracy, counting on increased world scrutiny to save them if the Russian government decides they're foreign agents after all? 

It's disappointing to think that Sochi's political effects will be as fleeting as the games themselves, and hopefully some lasting good will come from all this.  If not, we at least got some amusing pictures of poorly-constructed hotel bathrooms out of it.

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