The tragedy is that my Russian Politics course only barely touched on the Crimean War, focusing instead on the Soviet Union and events of the past hundred years, so I lack the knowledge to make any historical comparisons to recent events. This piece provides a bit of background on the place that Russian troops may have invaded - I have to say "may" because they're not wearing insignia, but the soldiers reportedly speak Russian, they showed up a day after a pro-Russian leader took over Crimea and asked for Russia's assistance keeping the peace, and the same day Russia's parliament authorized military force in Ukraine.
The motive ascribed for this invasion/peacekeeping mission seems to be Putin wanting Ukraine in Russia's sphere of influence by any means necessary, which is in a word "reckless," and more to the point a few days overdue. Wouldn't it have been easier to send forces to prop up Yanukovych's regime while it was still dysfunctional, as opposed to collapsed? But alternative explanations don't make much sense - Crimean demonstrations of the past few days have been overwhelmingly pro-Russian, so unless Russia believed the rumors that the new regime was going to send forces to try and take over the autonomous region (a somewhat suicidal action), they shouldn't feel in danger of "losing" it.
So Putin is either trying to recapture something he didn't try to save, or else protecting something that isn't in danger, and in the process creating a mountain of uncertainty, exacerbating an already tumultuous situation, and bringing up the specter of great power war in Europe if the West gets drawn in. Reports from a few days ago warned of the situation in Crimea: these two analysts had some suggestions that are probably defunct now, while the aforementioned crisis guide to Crimea reasoned that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be counter-productive, so I'm not the only one surprised by this. Maybe the situation looks better in the Russian (Putin-friendly) media, the heroic rescue of loyal Russians from fascist, Western-backed revolutionaries?
The big question is what the US should do about Ukraine, which is a familiar question by this point, since we keep re-asking it every time the situation changes. Secretary of State Kerry has condemned the invasion, which Russia hasn't admitted has happened, while President Obama spent an hour and a half on the phone with Putin. The White House assures us that Obama warned that Russia's actions "would negatively impact Russia's standing in the international community," which is not so much a threat as it is a reminder of how global opinion works, and how it cannot physically stop you from invading a neighbor.
Others want us to do more - this fellow notes that we haven't even called a Security Council meeting on the topic (remember that Russia has a permanent veto on said council), and urges Congress to act where the Obama Administration has not, by passing new sanction legislation on Iran. This would not directly help the situation in Crimea, but it may put more backbone into America's foreign policy, so that the next time Russia invades a country they may have to think twice.
Problem is, our options are limited. Nobody wants a fight with Russia, even if defending a country with a history of resisting invaders wouldn't present the sort of problems encountered by those who tried to invade Russia itself. More than that, if we wanted a fight with Russia, our army just got out of two long, nasty wars, and if you believe this commentary, has been emasculated by defense cuts. Some in Congress are proposing sanctions, "targeted" and unspecified, though I'm not sure how we could hurt an economy based on resource extraction, especially if we prefer to get our oil from Arabian rather than Slavic autocrats.
The other issue would be the basis for our actions. Intervening in Ukraine naturally raises questions about why we aren't intervening in countries like Syria, where citizens are not welcoming the offending army as brothers and protectors. If we call Russia's actions an unlawful invasion, they can point at Iraq. If we take issue with the pro-Russian mobs taking over Crimea, they can point to the pro-Western mobs that took over Kiev. If we accuse Russia of trampling democracy in defense of its Black Sea naval base, they can remind us that Bahrain is #8 on Politico's list of America's top 25 Most Awkward Allies. If we speak of the importance of democracy and self-determination, they can argue that eastern Ukrainians want close ties with Russia, and their chief complaint with the country's previous leader was his level of repression, not his international alignment.
In short, our objection to the situation in Crimea largely boils down to the fact that the wrong guy is "winning," i.e. not us. Admitting this would be refreshingly honest, yet depressingly realist. The United States ought to be better than that, at least able to appeal to the principles it likes to insist it upholds.
There's still potential for common ground, though. The developing situation is in danger of making Sarah Palin look like some sort of political visionary, and I'm not sure anyone wants that. It's not too late, Putin - you can either validate the guys who lost the 2008 election, or take a stand for sanity.
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